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Abstract— Recent high-profile cyber attacks exemplify why
organizations need better cyber defenses. Cyber threats are
hard to accurately predict because attackers usually try to
mask their traces. However, they often discuss exploits and
techniques on hacking forums. The community behavior of the
hackers may provide insights into groups’ collective malicious
activity. We propose a novel approach to predict cyber events
using sentiment analysis. We test our approach using cyber
attack data from 2 major business organizations. We consider
3 types of events: malicious software installation, malicious
destination visits, and malicious emails that surpassed the target
organizations’ defenses. We construct predictive signals by
applying sentiment analysis on hacker forum posts to better
understand hacker behavior. We analyze over 400K posts
generated between January 2016 and January 2018 on over
100 hacking forums both on surface and Dark Web. We find
that some forums have significantly more predictive power than
others. Sentiment-based models that leverage specific forums
can outperform state-of-the-art deep learning and time-series
models on forecasting cyber attacks weeks ahead of the events.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent high-profile cyber attacks—the massive denial of
service attack using Mirai botnet, infections of comput-
ers word-wide with WannaCry and Petya ransomware, the
Equifax data breach—highlight the need for organizations
to develop cyber crime defenses. Cyber threats are hard
to identify and predict because the hackers that conduct
these attacks often obfuscate their activity and intentions.
However, they may still use publicly accessible forums dis-
cuss vulnerabilities and share tradecraft about how to exploit
them. The behavior of the hacker community, as expressed
in such venues, may provide insights into group’s malicious
intent. It has been shown that computational models based on
various behavior learning theories can help in cyber security
situational awareness [1]. While cyber situation awareness
[2], [3] is critical for defending networks, it is focused
on detecting cyber events. In this paper, we describe a
computational method that analyzes discussions on hacker
forums to predict cyber attacks.
Opinion mining or sentiment analysis can be linked all
the way back to Freud’s 1901 paper on how slips of the
tongue can reveal a person’s hidden intentions [4]. While
sentiment analysis was originally developed in the field of
linguistics and psychology, it has recently been applied to
a number of other fields with the first seminal work in the
computational sciences being Pang 2002 [5]. Historically, the
context it has been applied to are social networks, comments
(such as on news sites) and reviews (either for products or
movies). In this work, we apply sentiment analysis to posts
on Dark Web forums with the purpose of forecasting cyber
attacks. The Dark Web consists of websites that are not
indexed nor searchable by standard search engine and can
only be accessed using a special browser service.
We further explore the link between community behavior
and malicious activity. The connection between security
and human behavior has been studied in designing new
technology [6], here we look to reverse engineer by mapping
the malicious events to hacker behavior. Social media has
been shown to be a source of useful data on human behavior
and used to predict real world events [7], [8], [9]. Here, we
inspect the ability of hacker forums to predict cyber events.
We consider each individual forum, applying sentiment anal-
ysis to each post in the forum. After computing a daily
average per forum and a 7 day running average sentiment
signal per forum, we test these signals against ground truth
data. We determine some forums have significantly more
predictive power and these isolated forums can beat the
evaluation models in 36% of the months under study using
precision and recall of predictions within a 39-hour window
of the event.
II. DATA
A. Hacker Forum Texts
We look at hacking forums from both the Surface Web
and the Dark Web from 1 January 2016 to 31 January 2018.
The Dark Web refers to sites accessible through The Onion
Router private network platform [10]. The Surface Web
refers to the World Wide Web accessible through standard
browsers. In this paper, we focus only on English posts from
113 forums which were identified based on cyber security
keywords consisting of 432,060 posts. The text from these
forums were accessed using the methods proposed in [11],
[12].
B. Ground truth data
We use ground truth data of cyber attacks from 2 major
organizations in the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) industry.
Henceforth, we will refer to them as Organization A and
Organization B for anonymity. The ground truth comprises
3 event types:
• endpoint-malware: a malicious software installation
such as ransomware, spyware and adware is discovered
on a company endpoint device.
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• malicious-destination a visit by a user to a URL or IP
address that is malicious in nature or a compromised
website.
• malicious-email receipt of an email that contains a
malicious email attachment and/or a link to a known
malicious destination.
III. SENTIMENT ANALYSIS
The first effective use of sentiment analysis in a predictive
sense was by Pang et. al. [5] in assessing movie reviews.
Since then, sentiment analysis has expanded to other fields.
Sentiment analysis can be done with or without supervision
(label training data). Supervised methods can be adapted to
create trained models for specific purposes and contexts. The
drawback is that labeled data may be highly costly and often
researchers end up using AMT - Amazon Mechanical Turk.
The alternative is to use lexical-based methods that do not
rely on labeled data; however, it is hard to create a unique
lexical-based dictionary to be used for all different contexts.
Deep learning methods allow for additional functions like
taking into account order of words in a sentence like the
Stanford Recursive Deep Model. Methods can either be 2
way (positive or negative) or 3 way (positive, neutral, neg-
ative). Furthermore, dictionary based sentiment algorithms
are either polarity-based where sentiment is based only of
the frequency of positive or negative words whereas valence-
based methods factor the intensity of the words into polarity.
There are a number of issues with sentiment analysis which
include: word pairs, word tuples, emoticons, slang, sarcasm,
irony, questions, URLs, code, domain specific use of words
(shoot an email, dead link), and inversions (small is good
for portable electronics) which are difficult for computerized
text analysis to handle.
Studies have found that a methods prediction performance
varies considerably from one dataset to another. VADER
works well for some tweets, but not for others, depending
on the context. SentiStrength has good Macro F1 values, but
has low coverage because it tends to classify a high number
of instances as neutral.
The choice of a sentiment analysis is highly dependent
on the data and application, therefore you need to take
into account prediction performance and coverage. There
is no single method that always achieves a consistent rank
position for different datasets. Therefore, in this paper we
test multiple methods for sentiment analysis. Most languages
themselves are biased positive and if a lexicon is built on
data, the positive bias that data can lead to a bias in the
lexicon. This is why most methods are better at classifying
positive than neutral or negative methods meaning that they
are biased, neutral are the hardest to detect [13].
A. Vader
VADER: Valence Aware Dictionary for sEntiment Rea-
soning [14] is a rule-based sentiment model that has both a
dictionary and associated intensity measures. It’s dictionary
has been tuned for microblog-like contexts and they incor-
porate 5 generalizable rules that goes beyond pure dictionary
lookups:
1) Increase intensity due to exclamation point
2) Increase intensity due to all caps in the presence of
other non-all cap words
3) Increase intensity with degree modifiers i.e. extremely
4) Negate sentiment with contrastive conjunction i.e. but
5) Examine the preceding tri-gram to identify cases where
negation flips the polarity of the text.
Therefore, VADER not only captures positive or negative,
but also how positive and how negative beyond simple words
counts. It is made further robust by the additional rules. It’s
”gold standard” lexicon was developed manually and with
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Vader scores range from 0.0 to
1.0.
B. LIWC
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) [15] was a
pioneer in the computerized text analysis field with the first
major iteration in 2007, we used the updated version LIWC
2015. It has two components: the processing component and
the dictionaries. The heart of LIWC are the dictionaries that
contain the lookup words in psychometric categories which is
able to resolve content words from style words. LIWC counts
the inputted words in psychologically meaningful categories
which produces close to 100 dimensions for any given text
being analyzed. For the purposes of this research, we are
only focused on Tone which bests maps to sentiment as we
have defined it. The Tone scores range from 0 to 100. LIWC
also ignores context, irony, sarcasm, and idioms.
C. SentiStrength
SentiStrength [16] is another lexicon-based sentiment clas-
sifier which leverages dictionaries and non-lexical linguistics
information to detect sentiment. SentiStrength focuses on the
strength of the sentiment and uses weights for the words
in its dictionaries. Additionally, positive sentiment strength
and negative sentiment strength is scored separately. Each
is scored from 1 to 5, with 5 being the greatest strength.
For our purposes, we seek overall sentiment so we subtract
the negative sentiment from the positive sentiment so that
strongly positive (5,1) becomes 4, neutral (1,1) becomes
0 and strongly negative (1,5) becomes -4. Therefore, Sen-
tiStrength scorese range from -4 to 4. SentiStrength is
designed to do better with social media; however, it can’t
exploit indirect indicators of sentiment. It is also weaker for
positive sentiment in news-related discussions.
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section we document the methodology used and
process workflow from the data processing to signal gener-
ation through warning generation and signal testing. Three
cases studies are used to illustrate the process via example
and Figure X provides a visual reference.
A. Processing the Data
Working with researchers at Arizona State University, we
were able to develop a database of posts from forums on
both the Dark Web and Surface Web which discuss computer
security and network vulnerability topics. To protect the
future utility of these sources, each forum has been coded
with a number (forumid) from 1 to 350. The data consist
of the forumid, date the post was made, and the text of the
post. The data in this study was from 1 January 2016 to 31
January 2018. The data was collected by ASU and we used
an API to pull and store the data in a local server and access
it via Apache Lucene’s Elastic Search engine.
B. Evaluating Sentiment Analysis
After a review of the sentiment analysis methods in Sen-
tiBench [13], we decided to use Vader[14], SentiStrenght[16]
and LIWC15[15]. For social networks, VADER and LIWC15
were found to be the best method for 3-class classification
and SentiStrength was the winner for 2-class classification.
[13] These three methods were used because they Vader has
a Python module, SentiStrenght has a Java implementation
and LIWC15 is a stand-alone program.
C. Computing Daily Averages
A sentiment score for each forum post was computed using
the three sentiment methods outlined above. Since there can
be multiple posts on a forum for a day, we characterization
the overall sentiment of the day with a daily average. There
can be a wide range of sentiment scores for any given day,
especially if there are a lot of posts from on a popular forum.
In order to understand the trend of sentiment over time, we
compute running averages.
D. Computing Running Averages
A running daily average was computed in order to assess
the trend of sentiment over time. The more days in the run-
ning average, the smoother the curve and the harder to detect
a change. Whereas no using a running average or making it
only 1 or 2 days would have many jump discontinuities and
swings. We looked at adjusting the running average from 1
to 30 days and settled on 7 days primarily because that was
our original prediction window. Figure 1 shows the average
F1 score various signals computed with running averages of
3, 7, 10 and 14 days.
E. Standardizing the Score
To make the 3 sentiment scores more comparable, their
scores were standardized. As previously mentioned, VADER
generates sentiment scores on a scale of 0 to 1, SentiStrength
goes from -4 to 4, and LIWC goes from 0 to 100 for Tone.
While standardizing the scores do not affect the correlation
any forum would have with the ground truth from our
target organizations, it will be necessary when we potentially
combine signals from various forums and sentiment methods
to find more powerful predictors.
Fig. 1: Average F1 Scores by Signal using Different Running
Averages
F. Compute Correlations to Find Potential Signals
As previously mention, we have ground truth events
from 2 defense industrial base organizations of 3 different
cyber event types. The event types are endpoint-malware,
malicious-destination and malicious-email. Correlations were
computed between all forum-sentiments against all event
types from both organizations. Additionally, since we are
looking for predictive signals, we computed correlations with
a negative lag from 0 to 30 days with a lag of -30 meaning
offset the sentiment signal 30 days before the organization’s
event occurrence. A number of signals stood out as being
more correlated than others against certain event types as
seen in Figure I. This shows the LIWC sentiment on Forum
84 against Organization B’s endpoint-malware events. The
fact that multiple, consecutive lags have low p-values gives
some indication that this might be a useful signal.
G. Forecasting Models
We also apply widely-used ARIMA model for forecasting
events. ARIMA stands for autoregressive integrated mov-
ing average. The key idea is that the number of current
events (yt) depends on the past counts and forecast errors.
Formally, ARIMA(p,d,q) defines an autoregressive model
with p autoregressive lags, d difference operations, and q
moving average lags (see [17]). Given the observed series of
events Y = (y1, y2, . . . , yT ), ARIMA(p,d,q) applies d (≥ 0)
difference operations to transform Y to a stationary series Y ′.
Then the predicted value y′t at time point t can be expressed
in terms of past observed values and forecasting errors which
is as follows:
y′t = µy ++
p∑
i=1
αiy
′
t−i +
q∑
j=1
βjet−j + et (1)
Here µy is a constant, αi is the autoregressive (AR)
coefficient at lag i, βj is the moving average (MA) coefficient
at lag j, et−j = y′t−j− yˆ′t−j is the forecast error at lag j, and
et is assumed to be the white noise (et ∼ N (0, σ2)). The
AR model is essentially an ARIMA model without moving
average terms.
TABLE I: Best Signals for Organization B’s Events
Forum# Sent Lag Correlation p Value Events
84 LIWC -11 0.2170 0.000055 EP-Mal
84 LIWC -12 0.2221 0.000037 EP-Mal
84 LIWC -14 0.2185 0.000052 EP-Mal
219 Vader -18 -0.2329 0.000079 EP-Mal
264 LIWC -10 0.2472 0.000040 EP-Mal
264 LIWC -12 0.2362 0.000095 EP-Mal
264 LIWC -15 0.2380 0.000091 EP-Mal
159 Senti -14 0.8498 0.000008 Mal-Email
266 Senti -14 -0.5517 0.000058 Mal-Email
261 LIWC -3 0.2173 0.000043 Mal-Dest
266 Senti -27 -0.6243 0.000080 Mal-Dest
We use maximum likelihood estimation for learning the
parameters; more specifically, parameters are optimized with
LBFGS method [18]. These models assume that (p, d, q) are
known and the series is weakly stationary. To select the
values for (p, d, q) we employ grid search over the values
of (p, d, q) and select the one with minimum AIC score.
H. Testing Signals with ARIMAX
Again, Table I shows the signals that are better correlated
with Organization B’s ground truth events. The next step
is to test these signals to see if they have any predictive
power. To do this, the ARIMA model is used with the ground
truth events to develop a baseline model from which to
compare potential signals for the potential to have predictive
power. Additionally, 4 other methods were used for com-
parison: Dark-Mentions, Deep-Exploit [19], ARIMAX with
abuse.ch and a daywise-hourly-baserate model. Using ground
truth events from both Organization A and Organization
B, sentiment signals from the various forums, computed
with the different methodologies were tested. Testing was
done across the 3 event types for both Organizations with
Precision, Recall and F1 computed to evaluate the signal. The
timeseries of the sentiment for a given forum and sentiment
method was used as the input to the timeseries forecasting
model to predict future events. The model was trained on
data from April 1, 2016 to May 31, 2017, in order to
start generating warnings for the month of June 2017. After
predictions were made for the month of June, they were
scored against the actual ground truth and then the model
was ran again to predict warnings for August 2017. This
was done for all the way through January 2018.
I. Scoring
To determine how well the signals under study performed,
a matching algorithm was used to compare the date occur-
rence of the predicted events with the actual events that
occurred. Using the matching algorithm, we could consis-
tently score which predicted events should be mapped to
actual events and which predicted events did not occur as
well as which actual events were not predicted. There is a
window around the actual events which varies based on the
event type. Endpoint-maleware has to be within 0.875 days,
malicious-destination within 1.625 days and malicious-email
within 1.375 days.
J. External Signals
Currently, there are other external signals that the data
provider Organizations are currently evaluating for predictive
potential. Again, external signals are timeseries information
derived from open sources that are not based on informa-
tion system network data. The other external signals under
evaluation are:
• ARIMAX: is the same model outlined in §4.7; however,
time series counts of malicious activity are acquired
from https://abuse.ch and used in conjunction
with historical data.
• Baseline: is the exact same model in §4.7 with no
external signal and using only historical ground truth
data to predict the future rate of attack.
• Daywise-Baserate: is the same as the ARIMAX model
mentioned above; however, the model takes day of the
week into consideration assuming that the event rate for
each day of the week is not the same.
• Deep-Exploit: is an ARIMA model that is based on the
vulnerability analysis determined by [20]. This method
referred to as DarkEmbed learns the embeddings of
Dark Web posts and then uses a trained exploit classifier
to predicted which vulnerabilities in Dark Web posts
might be exploited.
• Dark-Mentions: Is an extension of [21] which predicts
if a disclosed vulnerability will be exploited based on
a variety of data sources in addition to the Dark Web
using methods still being developed. These predictions
are used to construct a rule based forecasting method
based on keyword mentions in Dark Web forums and
marketplaces.
V. RESULTS
After generating ARIMAX models with each potential
signal, they were scored as mentioned above for each month
from July 2017 to January 2018. The following tables show
the results for the months under study. By month, you can see
the number of actual ground truth events (Evt), the number of
warnings generated by each signal (Warn), and the precision
(P), recall (R) and F1 score for each. The table is sorted by
largest F1 score for each month with only the top five signals
listed. Signals generated by sentiment analysis that were part
of the top five for each month are highlighted in light blue.
A. Organization A
Table II shows Organization A’s endpoint-malware where
sentiment signals dominated July, September and November
and did reasonable well in the remaining months. Every
month a sentiment signal beat at least on evaluation model.
Malicious-Destination (Table III) had periodic performance
July, September, November and January but the case is
not as strong as Endpoint-Malware. Lastly, Table IV shows
Malicious-Email results which illustrate that sentiment sig-
nals did well in July to September with waning results for
the later months. Upon further inspection this is believed to
be due to some key forums going offline toward the end of
the year.
TABLE II: Results from Organization A’s Endpoint-Malware
Month Evt Warn Signal P R F1
July 15 14 forum211-Senti 0.57 0.53 0.55
July 15 29 forum196-LIWC 0.41 0.80 0.55
July 15 27 forum89-Senti 0.41 0.73 0.52
July 15 12 forum111-LIWC 0.58 0.47 0.52
July 15 9 baseline 0.67 0.40 0.50
August 19 14 baseline 0.71 0.53 0.61
August 19 11 forum111-LIWC 0.82 0.47 0.60
August 19 35 forum8-Vader 0.46 0.84 0.59
August 19 8 daywise-baserate 1.00 0.42 0.59
August 19 23 forum230-Senti 0.52 0.63 0.57
September 18 16 forum111LIWC 0.69 0.61 0.65
September 18 32 forum250LIWC 0.50 0.89 0.64
September 18 35 forum211vader 0.46 0.89 0.60
September 18 41 forum147LIWC 0.41 0.94 0.58
September 18 41 forum194LIWC 0.41 0.94 0.58
October 6 14 daywise-baserate 0.29 0.67 0.40
October 6 35 baseline 0.17 1.00 0.29
October 6 29 forum8vader 0.17 0.83 0.29
October 6 37 forum111LIWC 0.16 1.00 0.28
October 6 43 forum211vader 0.14 1.00 0.24
November 27 38 forum6senti 0.63 0.89 0.74
November 27 42 forum147LIWC 0.60 0.93 0.72
November 27 40 forum111LIWC 0.60 0.89 0.72
November 27 41 forum211senti 0.59 0.89 0.71
November 27 43 forum121LIWC 0.56 0.89 0.69
December 13 18 arimax 0.33 0.46 0.39
December 13 16 dark-mentions 0.31 0.38 0.34
December 13 80 forum121LIWC 0.16 1.00 0.28
December 13 73 forum194LIWC 0.16 0.92 0.28
December 13 10 deep-exploit 0.30 0.23 0.26
January 1 15 dark-mentions 0.07 1.00 0.13
January 1 37 forum6senti 0.03 1.00 0.05
January 1 61 forum147LIWC 0.02 1.00 0.03
January 1 64 baseline 0.02 1.00 0.03
January 1 19 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
B. Organization B
Table V shows that sentiment signals do best for July
and October for Malicious-Destination. While baseline and
daywise-baserate dominate the other months, sentiment sig-
nals perform better than the other evaluation models. Similar
to Organization A, the Malicious-Destination for Organiza-
tion B (Table VI) does the best early in July in August
and moderately well in September to November until de-
grading to below all evaluation models in December and
January. This may be due the few number of events and
perhaps sentiment signals do not perform the best under low
frequency conditions. The performance for Malicious-Email
(Table VII) is oddly cyclical; however, sentiment signals
dominated December and beat at least one evaluation model
for every month.
VI. RELATED WORK
Given the serious nature of cyber attacks, naturally there
are a number of other research efforts to predict such attacks.
As it relates to our efforts, the three main areas of research
are sentiment analysis in cyber security, predictive methods
for cyber attacks and leveraging dark web data in cyber
security.
TABLE III: Results from Organization A’s Malicious-
Destination
Month Evt Warn Signal P R F1
July 4 5 baseline 0.40 0.50 0.44
July 4 3 daywise-baserate 0.33 0.25 0.29
July 4 17 dark-mentions 0.12 0.50 0.19
July 4 42 forum266-LIWC 0.05 0.50 0.09
July 4 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
August 10 6 baseline 1.00 0.60 0.75
August 10 10 daywise-baserate 0.60 0.60 0.60
August 10 8 dark-mentions 0.50 0.40 0.44
August 10 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
August 10 0 deep-exploit 0.00 0.00 0.00
September 4 15 forum194LIWC 0.20 0.75 0.32
September 4 15 forum210LIWC 0.20 0.75 0.32
September 4 15 forum264LIWC 0.20 0.75 0.32
September 4 15 forum6senti 0.20 0.75 0.32
September 4 15 forum194LIWC 0.20 0.75 0.32
October 2 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
October 2 0 dark-mentions 0.00 0.00 0.00
October 2 5 daywise-baserate 0.00 0.00 0.00
October 2 0 deep-exploit 0.00 0.00 0.00
November 1 5 daywise-baserate 0.20 1.00 0.33
November 1 6 forum111LIWC 0.17 1.00 0.29
November 1 6 forum147LIWC 0.17 1.00 0.29
November 1 30 forum210senti 0.03 1.00 0.06
November 1 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 1 10 daywise-baserate 0.10 1.00 0.18
December 1 11 dark-mentions 0.09 1.00 0.17
December 1 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 1 0 deep-exploit 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 2 24 forum111LIWC 0.08 1.00 0.15
January 2 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 2 10 dark-mentions 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 2 9 daywise-baserate 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 2 0 deep-exploit 0.00 0.00 0.00
A. Sentiment Analysis in Cyber Security
The closest work which has applied sentiment analysis
of hacker forums to cyber security is [22]. While much
research has investigated the specifics of cyber attacks, [22]
investigates the actual cyber actors via their communication
activities. Their focus was the cyber-physical systems related
to critical infrastructure and they developed an automated
analysis tool to identify potential threats against such in-
frastructure. Despite recognizing that there are over 140
hacker forums on the public web, the authors chose only one
forum to scrape the complete forum once. They leveraged
the Open Discussion Forum Crawler to do the scrapping
and then used OpenNLP to tag parts of speech, filtering on
nouns. Those nouns were cross referenced with three list
of malicious keywords to identify posts whose sentiment
would be determined with SentiStrength. Contextual analysis
of keyword pairings with sentiment scores allowed them to
confirm current statistics about critical infrastructure cyber
attacks. The main differences illustrated in our work is
that we use looked at over 100 forums, not just one from
both the Dark Web and Surface Web. In collecting posts
for over a two year period, we found the sentiment of all
posts applying Vader and LIWC for sentiment in addition to
just SentiStrength. Furthermore, we were able to model our
data against ground truth events from companies making our
approach predictive in nature.
TABLE IV: Results from Organization A’s Malicious-Email
Month Evt Warn Signal P R F1
July 26 21 forum210-LIWC 0.76 0.62 0.68
July 26 27 forum250-LIWC 0.67 0.69 0.68
July 26 19 forum147-LIWC 0.74 0.54 0.62
July 26 36 forum159-Senti 0.53 0.73 0.61
July 26 17 forum28-LIWC 0.76 0.50 0.60
August 11 17 forum179-Vader 0.59 0.91 0.71
August 11 15 forum250-LIWC 0.60 0.82 0.69
August 11 7 daywise-baserate 0.86 0.55 0.67
August 11 18 forum210-Senti 0.50 0.82 0.62
August 11 25 forum159-Senti 0.44 1.00 0.61
September 15 36 forum264LIWC 0.36 0.87 0.51
September 15 17 daywise-baserate 0.47 0.53 0.50
September 15 18 forum210senti 0.44 0.53 0.48
September 15 45 forum147LIWC 0.31 0.93 0.47
September 15 46 forum6senti 0.28 0.87 0.43
October 11 14 daywise-baserate 0.50 0.64 0.56
October 11 8 deep-exploit 0.50 0.36 0.42
October 11 42 forum264LIWC 0.17 0.64 0.26
October 11 51 forum194LIWC 0.16 0.73 0.26
October 11 102 forum8vader 0.11 1.00 0.19
November 50 16 daywise-baserate 0.69 0.22 0.33
November 50 4 deep-exploit 0.75 0.06 0.11
November 50 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
November 50 0 dark-mentions 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 17 22 daywise-baserate 0.55 0.71 0.62
December 17 10 deep-exploit 0.80 0.47 0.59
December 17 5 dark-mentions 0.80 0.24 0.36
December 17 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 40 18 daywise-baserate 0.94 0.43 0.59
January 40 8 deep-exploit 0.75 0.15 0.25
January 40 6 dark-mentions 0.83 0.13 0.22
January 40 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
BiSAL [23] did sentiment analysis in English and Arabic
on Dark Web forums with slight modification to cyber
security terms. Other work such as [24] use sentiment in
measuring radicalization. Remaining research in sentiment
analysis, not specific to cyber security was presented earlier.
B. Predicting Cyber Attack
The issue of predicting cyber attacks is not new and
their has been a considerable research effort in this field.
The efforts split along two categories, using network traffic
or non-network traffic. Forecasting methods such as [25],
[26], [27] analyze network traffic. Where [25] is specific
to predicting attacks using IPV4 packet traffic, and [26]
looks at various network sensors at different layers to prevent
unwanted Internet traffic, whereas [27] combines DNS traffic
with security metadata such as number of policy violations
and the number of clients in the network. Many researchers
such as [28] based cyber prediction on open source infor-
mation. They use the National Vulnerability Database. They
highlight the difficulty in using public sources for building
effective models. Other work has focused on detecting cyber
bullying using graph detection models [29] with success, but
is limited in malicious activity and not a predictive model.
The closest to our research is Gandotra et al [30] who
outlined a number cyber prediction efforts using statistical
modeling and algorithmic modeling. They highlight several
significant challenges that we tried to address. The first
challenge is that open source ground truth is incomplete
TABLE V: Results from Organization B’s Endpoint-Malware
Month Evt Warn Signal P R F1
July 18 47 forum264LIWC 0.38 1.00 0.55
July 18 50 forum250LIWC 0.36 1.00 0.53
July 18 43 baseline 0.37 0.89 0.52
July 18 35 forum8senti 0.37 0.72 0.49
July 18 50 forum111LIWC 0.32 0.89 0.47
August 28 39 baseline 0.67 0.93 0.78
August 28 31 forum264LIWC 0.65 0.71 0.68
August 28 32 forum121LIWC 0.63 0.71 0.67
August 28 35 forum211vader 0.60 0.75 0.67
August 28 33 forum194LIWC 0.61 0.71 0.66
September 31 40 baseline 0.60 0.77 0.68
September 31 38 forum210senti 0.61 0.74 0.67
September 31 37 forum121LIWC 0.57 0.68 0.62
September 31 46 forum219vader 0.50 0.74 0.60
September 31 30 forum194LIWC 0.60 0.58 0.59
October 53 44 forum210LIWC 0.77 0.64 0.70
October 53 47 baseline 0.74 0.66 0.70
October 53 41 forum264LIWC 0.78 0.60 0.68
October 53 39 forum250LIWC 0.74 0.55 0.63
October 53 40 forum8vader 0.73 0.55 0.62
November 37 52 daywise-baserate 0.62 0.86 0.72
November 37 49 forum121LIWC 0.57 0.76 0.65
November 37 53 forum147LIWC 0.55 0.78 0.64
November 37 50 forum111LIWC 0.56 0.76 0.64
November 37 50 forum194LIWC 0.56 0.76 0.64
December 35 30 daywise-baserate 0.67 0.57 0.62
December 35 27 baseline 0.63 0.49 0.55
December 35 23 forum250LIWC 0.65 0.43 0.52
December 35 28 forum194LIWC 0.57 0.46 0.51
December 35 29 forum147LIWC 0.55 0.46 0.50
January 43 42 baseline 0.60 0.58 0.59
January 43 37 daywise-baserate 0.59 0.51 0.55
January 43 35 forum219vader 0.60 0.49 0.54
January 43 37 forum111LIWC 0.57 0.49 0.53
January 43 37 forum147LIWC 0.57 0.49 0.53
and should be compiled from multiple sources and analysis
doesn’t scale to real world scenarios. We were able to get
ground truth data from 2 companies that operate in the
defense industrial base, this ground truth is across three
different attack vectors and is over a two year time period.
The additional challenges in [30] focus on the volume, speed
and heterogeneity of network data which we avoid since we
are attempting to prevent cyber events specifically with non-
network data. They also present two modeling approaches
of statistical modeling and algorithmic modeling. We used
statistical models not unlike what they present as classical
time series models with auto-regressive, integrated moving
average with historical data and external signals.
C. Dark Web Research
There has been a lot of research recently concerning the
Dark Web or websites not indexed by major search engines.
Typically the Dark Web refers to the TOR [10] network
which is only accessible via specialized browsers. It has been
shown by [12] that from an overall cyber security threat
perspective, the Dark Web provides a valuable source of
information for malicious activity. They developed a system
that scrapes hacker forum and marketplace sites on the Dark
Web to develop threat warnings for cyber defenders. We
leverage the same data source but perform sentiment analysis
TABLE VI: Results from Organization B’s Malicious-
Destination
Month Evt Warn Signal P R F1
July 6 8 forum130vader 0.63 0.83 0.71
July 6 8 forum8senti 0.63 0.83 0.71
July 6 8 forum111LIWC 0.50 0.67 0.57
July 6 12 forum194LIWC 0.42 0.83 0.56
July 6 9 forum210senti 0.44 0.67 0.53
August 8 6 forum210senti 0.67 0.50 0.57
August 8 17 daywise-baserate 0.35 0.75 0.48
August 8 13 forum211senti 0.38 0.63 0.48
August 8 5 forum210LIWC 0.60 0.38 0.46
August 8 21 forum8vader 0.29 0.75 0.41
September 6 11 daywise-baserate 0.55 1.00 0.71
September 6 9 forum210LIWC 0.56 0.83 0.67
September 6 10 forum250LIWC 0.30 0.50 0.37
September 6 11 forum121LIWC 0.27 0.50 0.35
September 6 1 forum147LIWC 1.00 0.17 0.29
October 9 8 daywise-baserate 0.25 0.22 0.24
October 9 2 forum121LIWC 0.50 0.11 0.18
October 9 114 forum210senti 0.03 0.33 0.05
October 9 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
October 9 0 dark-mentions 0.00 0.00 0.00
November 4 14 daywise-baserate 0.29 1.00 0.44
November 4 5 forum210LIWC 0.20 0.25 0.22
November 4 21 forum219vader 0.10 0.50 0.16
November 4 9 forum211vader 0.11 0.25 0.15
November 4 13 forum210senti 0.08 0.25 0.12
December 3 12 daywise-baserate 0.17 0.67 0.27
December 3 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 3 0 dark-mentions 0.00 0.00 0.00
December 3 0 deep-exploit 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 5 18 daywise-baserate 0.22 0.80 0.35
January 5 0 arimax 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 5 0 dark-mentions 0.00 0.00 0.00
January 5 0 deep-exploit 0.00 0.00 0.00
to not only predict future threats, but to predict actual attacks.
They also leverage the Deep Net which is the portion of the
Surface Web not indexed by standard search engines.
While not using sentiment analysis, [31] offers insight to
the trust establishment between participants in Dark Web
forums. There may be behavioral patterns of malicious actors
that provide insight to future activity. Dark Web conversa-
tions were shown to provide earlier insights than Surface
Web conversations by [19] indicating potential predictive
power for cyber events. [19] highlight two cases with a major
DDoS attack and the Mirai attack. There may also be early
insights on the Surface Web in many of the social media
sites as illustrated in [32]. Our work focused only on forums
where it was likely that computer security items would be
discussed, but does contain a mix of Dark Web and Surface
Web. There has been work using natural language processing
on Dark Web text for predictive method such as [20]. Other
predictive approaches such as Cyber Attacker Model Profile
(CAMP) [33], focus on the macro level of a country and
financial cyber crimes, where we look at a wider range of
malicious activity against specific target organizations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Malicious activity can be very devastating to national
security, economies, businesses and personal lives. As such,
cyber security professionals working with major organiza-
tions and nation states could use all the help they can get
TABLE VII: Results from Organization B’s Malicious-Email
Month Evt Warn Signal P R F1
July 24 49 forum210LIWC 0.33 0.67 0.44
July 24 56 forum210senti 0.30 0.71 0.43
July 24 75 baseline 0.23 0.71 0.34
July 24 81 daywise-baserate 0.21 0.71 0.32
July 24 81 forum130vader 0.21 0.71 0.32
August 57 55 forum111LIWC 0.55 0.53 0.54
August 57 70 baseline 0.49 0.60 0.54
August 57 91 daywise-baserate 0.43 0.68 0.53
August 57 107 forum147LIWC 0.39 0.74 0.51
August 57 153 forum6senti 0.33 0.88 0.48
September 179 70 daywise-baserate 0.76 0.30 0.43
September 179 102 forum210senti 0.58 0.33 0.42
September 179 180 forum210LIWC 0.40 0.40 0.40
September 179 100 forum147LIWC 0.54 0.30 0.39
September 179 76 baseline 0.57 0.24 0.34
October 71 125 daywise-baserate 0.50 0.87 0.63
October 71 118 baseline 0.49 0.82 0.61
October 71 90 forum211senti 0.53 0.68 0.60
October 71 142 forum194LIWC 0.44 0.89 0.59
October 71 150 forum210senti 0.42 0.89 0.57
November 426 104 daywise-baserate 0.67 0.16 0.26
November 426 205 forum264LIWC 0.39 0.19 0.25
November 426 118 baseline 0.55 0.15 0.24
November 426 251 forum210LIWC 0.31 0.18 0.23
November 426 579 forum210senti 0.20 0.27 0.23
December 51 69 forum210LIWC 0.30 0.41 0.35
December 51 329 forum147LIWC 0.09 0.55 0.15
December 51 313 forum111LIWC 0.08 0.51 0.14
December 51 249 forum194LIWC 0.08 0.41 0.14
December 51 284 forum211senti 0.08 0.45 0.14
January 10 12 deep-exploit 0.25 0.30 0.27
January 10 103 daywise-baserate 0.10 1.00 0.18
January 10 186 baseline 0.05 1.00 0.10
January 10 226 forum111LIWC 0.04 1.00 0.08
in preventing malicious activity. We present a methodology
to predict malicious cyber events by exploiting malicious
actor’s behavior via sentiment analysis of posts on hacker
forums. These forums on both Surface Web and Dark Web
have some predictive power to be used as signals external to
the network for forecasting attacks using time series models.
Using ground truth data from two major organizations in the
Defense Industrial Base across three different cyber event
types, we show that sentiment signals can be more predictive
than a baseline time series model. Additionally, they will
often beat other state of the art external signals, in the 7
months under study across the 3 event types from the 2
organizations, sentiment signals performed the best 15 out
of 42 times or 36%. The signal parameters need to be tuned
over significant historical data and the source forum could be
shut off or taken down at any time; however, an automated
implementation of this system would still be value added.
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